After signing ten free trade agreements between 1993 and 2001, Mexico as a world leader in foreign trade policy continues to negotiate with countries such as Japan, Panama, Uruguay or Argentina.
INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization has accounted for 90 Regional Trade Agreements that have been created among its 136 member countries (formerly GATT contracting parties) since 1995. The figure seems impressive for the dynamism of countries in the world to opt for bilaterals during the past five years (WTO 2001) . Besides Europe's activism, Mexico has become a world leader in signing ten RTAs from 1993 to date mainly because it has sought a network of bilateral accords across the world, both with developing countries and also with countries in the developed world.
What are argued reasons for this economy to generate a network of RTAs? A first hypothesis is trade diversification away from increased specialization and dependency from the US market during the past seven years of NAFTA operation. However, trade with its natural partner and the importance of Mexico's market access in North America seems to continue and even deepen in the foreseeable future.
The author wishes to thank Lourdes Dieck and an anonymous reviewer for very useful comments, and participants at the Inter American Seminar in Economics, NBER-ITESM, in Monterrey, Mexico, on November 15, 2002. Moreover, trade of intra-industrial nature as has been experienced by NAFTA, has deepened integration among trading and investment partners in key sectors of the North American panorama, to increase the competitive position of the entire North American region that faces apparent open regionalism.
A second line of reasoning is that Mexico's experience with NAFTA has generated a learning curve effect in signing multiple RTAs, mainly Free Trade Agreements with other countries, where most of them contain all the issues and clauses of NAFTA, or what could be called NAFTA-consistency. Aspects such as market access, tariffication, customs procedures, scheduling of liberalization, as well as national treatment/ MFN, norms, special treatment of sectors, and dispute resolution mechanisms, are integral part of Mexico's negotiation and signing of RTAs. Moreover, in some agreements, side accords on labor and mainly the environment have also been signed. In such argument, NAFTA becomes a sellable vehicle for trade and investment liberalization, taken strategically or appropriated by Mexico. However, in line with this argument, a limit would exist set by the ability of authorities to administer multiple RTAs.
A third hypothesis is that Mexico's objectives are the political economy ones, where additional to trade and investment liberalization, a rationale of political representation of partners, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean, is sought in other multilateral negotiations. According to the World Bank (WB 1999) , other political objectives are an increased bargaining position of members of a RTA; a strategy of 'being noticed' in multilateral rules of the game; cooperation in areas of government policy making and among incipient multinational companies of developing countries; and commitment to lock-in free market policies inside economies.
A fourth hypothesis is that additional to the learning curve effect, the political economy of generating a network of RTAs is that by seeking bilaterals instead of expanding original RTAs mainly NAFTA, Mexican authorities and economic agents, face economies of scale in negotiating increasing number of RTAs, or to put it in a different context, the cost of NAFTA expansion in political arenas among Mexico, the United States, and Canada, and possibly Chile, is too high both in each country's political market, and also in coordinating a regional effort. For such a reason, it seems easier for one of the regional partners to seek individual RTAs. The case that Mexico, the less developed of the NAFTA partners, has been the most active in signing multiple trade agreements could only be circumstantial, but could also imply that a race for strategic trade policy would stay as part of the foreign trade and investment environment in the foreseeable future, with all its implications and worries for trade-dependent and liberalizing economies.
The present essay addresses these issues of the recent strategy by Mexico. It also tries to explain whether the growing number of RTAs has negative or positive effects in members' welfare functions and overall welfare, using a simple Cournot model of market access following Freund (2000) . The paper is organized as follows: After briefly presenting evidence of Mexico's network of RTAs and NAFTA parity, a simple stylized model of market access is presented that clarifies the rationale for multiple RTAs as building blocks toward multilateral liberalization. In the fourth part, other economic considerations such as the role of rules of origin, and dispute resolution mechanisms are presented, that give rise to concerns on multiple trade areas. The next part presents noneconomic reasons that could be behind government negotiators in making Mexico a leader in RTA networking. The paper then presents final comments and a conclusion.
MEXICO'S REGIONAL TRADE AREAS
Trade and investment liberalization in Mexico can be traced back to around 1985, when the country entered GATT and changed its development plans from import substitution and debt-led growth that had become non-viable, to export promotion, the socalled National Program of Industry and Trade, and anti-inflationary measures. Trade-led growth was first experienced with an undervalued currency and a recessionary domestic market, such that implicitly subsidized exports permitted firms to maintain capacity utilization and experiment the first successes in international market penetration. After a new devaluation of the peso and debt renegotiation in 1987 and 1989, respectively, the Mexican economy underwent a period of domestic expansion with macroeconomic discipline and an aligned peso. Trade (exports and imports) became the driver not only for overall growth but also as a means to modernize firms and sectors to access both domestic and international markets, and establish price discipline in an economy that had experimented with high inflation rates.
A second period of unilateral trade liberalization deepened tariffication of import quotas and permits, dismantled other barriers to trade (such as financing, reduction of subsidies, and modernization of norms), and opened up the country to increased foreign investment participation by 1989 (Ibarra and Stolp 1990) . Overall, the economy experienced massive reforms towards a free trade model of development. The FTA implied the open interest by the US to expand trade, but also to support the free market policies of the Mexican government. For Mexico, the main objective at that point was mainly to expand trade and investment, and also to improve the country's risk assessment and visibility (Feinberg 1997; Andere and Kessel 1992) .
The negotiation of NAFTA began by mid 1991 and lasted until November of 1992. Much was followed from the US-Canadian trade deal of previous years, but NAFTA included aspects and procedures with more depth and extension than the USCanadian agreement. After passing congressional approval in 1992, side agreements on labor and the environment, requested by the new Clinton administration took place during 1993, for a launch of NAFTA on January 1, 1994. The negotiation period took 26 months, and involved government officials, advisors, industrial and commerce chambers under a newly formed private sector council (COECE), labor interests, and academics. It was the first experience with such a unique negotiation, not only for Mexico, but also for the US, and for Canada (Hufbauer and Schott 1993 under the European agricultural policies, and a dispute settlement mechanism that is a mix of NAFTA and WTO. Rules of origin and the schedule of liberalization follow NAFTA procedures and method of calculation, but do not necessarily converge. In the case of the European Union, the trade deal was more intricate because it was the first to be negotiated with a group of countries under the EU umbrella, and it encompassed aspects that mixed NAFTA experiences with a heavy load of Community rulings.
However, the success in such a case seemed to be to encapsulate trade and investment agreements, to stay separate from other political and social aspects.
Overall schedules of liberalization were spelled out following the NAFTA benchmark in most RTAs, with full liberalization generally in 10 years. Mexico accepted the asymmetries in levels of development, similar to NAFTA, where de-protection has been substantial on Mexico's part vis a vis other Latin American partners, that would move at a slower pace in their own bilateral liberalization with Mexico. In the case of the EU15, full liberalization will be achieved in 8 years, with a time frame of 3 years for European exports to be granted NAFTA tariff parity.
Other agreements complete the Mexican network of RTAs. Some like the APEC affiliation is of wide regional non-locked in tariff scheduling, while the rest are Complementation Agreements, which could become building blocks towards deep and wide RTAs, but the trend is not conclusive. However, an interest has been made public by the new Fox administration, to further its objective in the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the world. As an example, complementation agreements have been signed in Latin America with Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay.
As for the volume of trade, there are arguments that RTAs with integration of sectors and economic activities (some of intra-industrial nature and subcontracting) are sometimes wrongly analyzed with respect to employment generation and displacement.
Moreover, it is the generation of scale and scope economies, location factors, and deepening of production chains that international integration through trade should be assessed (Weintraub and Sands 1998) 
A MODEL OF TRADE FROM ALTERNATIVE RTAs
Tariff rates and asymmetric dynamics in reducing them in a RTA could blockade third country access or generate hold-up, but can also imply an attraction effect to extend an FTA, or the case of access of third countries. Also, superimposed RTAs could create trade diversion or trade suppression if diverse rules of origin exist.
A model of market access can be resembled by a game of production penetration, where rather than price competition of competing producers, market access is directly addressed. A second best linear Cournot model can be applied to explain effects of bilaterals versus addition of members to a RTA. It assumes imperfect competition, a fixed level of tariffs, and substitutability of competing suppliers. Although this stylized second best linear Cournot model cannot explain all aspects of the game of multiple RTAs, and it is static, it is useful to explain the optimal number of bilaterals that a country should seek, and whether signing new RTAs will render welfare improvements. It also can show the differences between two RTAs and a new member to an incumbent bilateral.
As a modeling exercise, assume three countries x, y, and z, where access is made explicit under diverse tariff schemes. A static representation of a Cournot game is useful to map equilibrium options of various tariff schemes. Later we discuss rules of origin and scale economies as additional trade imperfections.
Let x, y, and z be the three countries, with inverse demand functions in linear form, as follows:
where a is a constant, and q i j is quantity produced by country j for country i. The model is one of access in volume, or Cournot. The profit function for X expresses costs of production and a tariff that is positive, as follows:
where c is a constant marginal cost of production, and t is a tariff faced by X in market i.
An optimum for X over the quantity in market i, then is:
Similarly for countries Y and Z, the first order conditions are 
Dropping the superscript i for the destination market, if t x = t y = t z = 0, the solution to the three equation system is q x = q y = q z = q, which is the Cournot solution to an oligopoly under identical production costs. Now, moving the parameter a to the right hand side and writing the complete system in matrix form we have: 
And solving for q i x we have:
Similarly for Y and Z, the solution gives: 
With the above equations, one can make some intuitive comments. First, if tariffs to other countries are positive, domestic production increases, as shown in equation (9). If tariffs to third countries increase (equation 7), then sales of one country into another would also increase (relative tariff liberalization).
In a similar fashion and using the demand equation along with equation 7 and the system 8, total sales in country i are reduced (and prices increase) if tariffs are levied on other countries, hence reducing welfare, as shown by Freund (2000) .
The government's welfare function W of country X is the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses, plus the tariff revenue, as follows: that Mexico has sought the less than paretian equilibrium? Some other economic explanations have to be sought.
OTHER ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The Cournot model presented above, cannot account for the dynamics of RTAs.
An extension to some of the key behavioral and strategic aspects of trade liberalization is presented in this section. A generalized worry is that a RTA of the FTA form may lead to lobbying for protection by members of an agreement, against granting MFN treatment to non-members. In the case of a network of FTAs, deviations from homogeneous tariff and non-tariff reductions across agreements, could be welfare reducing both within blocs and outside them, as many studies of 'endogenous protection' try to show (Grossman and Helpman 1995; Krishna 1998; Panagariya and Findlay 1996) . However, the evidence of studies is non-conclusive. Wei and Frankel (1996) , for example, show that a RTA can move towards multilateralism by dividing previous opposition forces, whereas Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga (1998) However, the existence of economies of scale would have two negative effects: sunk costs as barriers to entry, and increasing lobbying by 'national champions' of a trade agreement, to be selectively protected. For Smith and Venables (1988), these effects should be weighed against efficiency gains through cost reductions and rationalization of location.
The evidence from developed countries is non-conclusive. What seems to be apparent is that economies of scale will generate a sort of duality in the production base, where 'national champions' will increasingly integrate both in homogeneous products or what can be taken as intra-industrial trade growth, and also in differentiated products. Now, for differentiated products, the modeled demand equations should include a differentiation parameter, which would make the model more complex, but that would not affect the theoretical logic. Turning now to experiences in the trade front, main
Mexican trade products with the US, with Canada, with Chile, and with Venezuela are of the intra-industrial nature. A policy worry by both Mexican and US authorities is how to extend the benefits of NAFTA and other FTAs by Mexico, to disintegrated sectors and firms, and whether compensation policies should be undertaken. That seems to also be the case, when negotiation was underway between Mexico and Nicaragua, MexicoBolivia, and Mexico-Northern Triangle countries. In those FTAs, restrictions to specific sectors meant some deviations from NAFTA parity.
Another key aspect not considered in the stylized model is the case of rules of origin. Rules of origin determine the nationality or regionality of a product to be subject to preferential tariff rates within a FTA. Rules of origin are also fundamental for determining quotas or anti-dumping measures. However, they can serve as a protectionist device, mainly by excluding products originated in non-members, even if they are transformed in a member country. In short, sufficient transformation becomes a cumbersome and subjective measure that could become discriminatory that is not presented in the model. Rules of origin affect the welfare functions depicted above, and transmit themselves through demand functions, costs, and even the preferential tariff rates, reducing the welfare improvement through trade diversion, but also via consumption and the very pattern of trade. They also reduce the effectiveness to administer a network of FTAs by Mexico, that makes it a cumbersome management and sets a limit to the network of FTAs. In part this reason is argued that the Mexican strategy could be second best, even if the FTAs are NAFTA compatible. However, the alternative to have a compact overall set of rules of origin for the entire Hemisphere seems implausible at present, additional to the fact that the asymmetric levels of development will not decline to converge on rules of origin. Are there differences between signing a network of individual FTAs and cementing them into a few RTAs with increasing members? Mexico has followed the first route. It has become a leader in Latin America and elsewhere in signing ten FTAs, plus the ones that will develop in the foreseeable future. The model shows that extension to more countries, rather than extension via multiple FTAs would be welfare enhancing.
There are only two reasons for which Mexico has followed an apparent spaghetti of FTAs: It either puts a heavy weight in domestic profit decline due to extended FTA members, or it has used the political economy visibility and lock-in argument step by step with a strategic view.
A last argument to seek multiple FTAs instead of FTA expansion is the case of an easier and less costly negotiation when coordination among former partners is troublesome. Mexico has sought deals in Latin America after 1995 with little or no coordination with the US, Canada, Chile and only with a political paradigm of NAFTA parity as discussed above. Moreover, if criticism of the FTA continues in various levels of the political front, then authorities in Mexico have sought the easiest way towards bilateral liberalizations, even with their efficiency costs.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Can one say that NAFTA is a success to the point of becoming the model for integrating the hemisphere? Mexico has sought NAFTA parity in its ten FTAs, both in Latin America, but also in Europe, and possibly with Japan in the foreseeable future.
What does the analysis of such a strategy show: A spaghetti regionalism or a strategic move towards becoming leader of hemispheric and multilateral integration?
It has been argued that welfare improves by increasing membership into a RTA, if the competitive effect and consumer surplus, outweigh government revenue loss and decline in profits. In the case of economies of scale, cost reduction and rationalization minimizes profit loss of domestic interests and makes the results of either multiple RTAs or extension of a RTA non-conclusive. Finally, political economy reasons mainly are apparent in lock-in and administration of bilaterals, but not necessarily in cooperation, bargaining, or visibility in policy making. The reasoning for the network of ten FTAs by Mexico, is that NAFTA parity has been useful and does necessarily make the so-called spaghetti regionalism less a concern than generally advocated, except for disputes that can give rise to free riding. However, commitment is shown not only to depend from the clauses and obligations set forth by a new FTA, but from endogenous commitment if players gain from a deal, as well as an overall pre-commitment by governments, if a strong underlying paradigm of integration emerges, and punishments are enforceable.
Finally, the model shows that the effects on production, profits, and market access under the various alternatives, depend on the partner characteristics. Then a question would be not only if there are limits to the number of RTAs to pursue, but also with whom to seek them.
